




Experimental markets can be a useful tool to guide and evaluate environmental policy. This
paper reviews four experiments to illustrate. Two institutional experiments are
considered--Coasian bargaining with positive transaction costs, and a gaming experiment of
dynamic choice in a conflict. Two valuation experiments are also discussed—the impact of
sequential reduction mechanisms on the value of risk, and experimental auction markets to
elicit the value of safer food
1. Introduction
If economists can have heroes, Peter Bohm,
Charles Plott, and Vernon Smith are three of
mine. 1Throughout the 70s and 80s, they blazed a
trail safe enough that greenhorns like myself no
longer needed to justify and defend experiments as
a viable research method in economics. Scores of
economists now employ laboratory experiments to
isolate, control and test alternative theories of
choice. 2 As a result, the lab plays a vital role in
economics. 3
Nevertheless, experimental economists can still
identify with econometricians from fifty years ago.
At that time an econometrician needed a scheme to
run a regression or linear program. Limited capac-
ity, time, and money constrained the number of
runs to a handful. Once the runs were complete—
that was it=cme either lived with the results or
went through the time-consuming process of col-
lecting more funds for more runs. But every curse
This paper draws on experimental research with my co-authors K. Baik,
T. Crocker, S. Fox, J. Herriges, D. Hayes, T. HoIt, J. Kliebenstein, and
S. Shin. They should not be held responsible for my comments. John
Lenz and Ann Pisher supplied useful comments. Journal paper no.
J-15552 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment
Station, Ames, IA Project no. 2994.
1 See Bohm (1984), Plott (1987, 1989), and Smith (1982) as a sam-
pler of experimental economics.
2 See for example the recent experimental economics textbook by
Davis and Hnlt (1993).
3 Shogrcn and Newell discuss the role nf theory and experiments in
economics relative to the role in ecology. In contrast to economics,
experiments have long played a major role in biology (alsn see Mayr, p.
30). The usefulness of experiments versus theory goes to the core of the
debate over the existence of an external world and the acquisition of
knowledge. Philosophers such as Bishop George Berkeley and John
Stuart Mill believed that ‘‘. nothin8 beyond experimental kaowledge
is either possible or necessmy” (Kline, p. 19). Obviously, others dis-
agree.
has its blessing—in this case, an imposed disci-
pline to identify and test the most interesting ques-
tions. Experimental economics forces the same
discipline today. One asks the question, develops
hypotheses, designs an experiment, runs the treat-
ments, pays the subjects, and either savors the re-
sults or searches for new funds to try again. Ex-
periments become habitual, rationally disciplining
one’s thinking about economics.
Let us advance this discipline one more step and
consider how experimental markets can be used to
guide environmental policy. Experiments moti-
vated by the questions of policy makers can pro-
vide insight into how a proposed change in incen-
tives or benefits will affect behavior. By supplying
information on the behavioral link between incen-
tives, values and choice, experimental markets can
influence how environmental policy is made and
evaluated. Since the lab environment differs from
the natural environment by necessity, experiments
should be viewed as a dress rehearsal and not the
play itself. Experimental markets do not generally
dictate policy, rather they are used to improve our
understanding of the underlying assumptions and
incentives that drive behavioral responses to pol-
icy.
In the following sections I rely on four different
examples to ilhtstrate the application of experi-
mental markets to environmental policy---Coasian
bargaining, environmental conflict, risk reduction
mechanisms, and the value of food safety. Based
on Smith’s (1982) triad of experimental econom-
ics—institution, preference, and actual behavior,
these examples are classified as either institutional
or valuation experiments. Institutional experiments
explore the efficiency of alternative incentive de-
sign and auction mechanisms to correct market
failure given preferences are held constant (e.g.,118 October 1993
Franciosi et al.).4 Coasian bargaining and environ-
mental conflict are examples of institutional exper-
iments. Valuation experiments reverse this and
elicit preferences for nonmarket goods such as risk
reduction or food safety, given the institutional
structure is held constant (e.g., Brookshire and
Coursey, Coursey, and Shogren et al.).
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Table 1. ExamDle Lotterv Schedule
Subject’s Number
Chance
to Win 1* 2 3 4@ 5 fj**
A 80% 65% 50% 40% 20% o
B o 20% 30% 60% 70% 80%
Joint
Chance 80% 85% 80% 100% 90% 80%
2. Coasian Bargaining
No idea has triggered more debate in environmen-
tal policy reform than the Cease theorem (Cease
1960), especially the role of transaction costs. The
theorem states that two disputing parties will bar-
gain until a private and socially optimal agreement
is reached, regardless of which party is assigned
the unilateral property right. Third-party interven-
tion is relegated to assigning unambiguous prop-
erty rights. Although experimental evidence sup-
ports highly efficient bargains,5 the basic com-
plaint is that the Cease theorem is a tautology—the
assumptions guarantee the outcome. The zero
transaction cost assumption guarantees there is no
incentive to terminate bargaining until the efficient
resource allocation is achieved. But Cease argues
he has been misunderstood; he is not the champion
of a zero-transactions-costs world. Rather he main-
tained that a legal system is immaterial to econom-
ics only when transaction costs are zero, and since
this world is nonexistent, the law matters. Cease
(1988, p. 15) states that ‘‘[w]hat my argument
does suggest is the need to introduce positive trans-
action costs explicitly into economic analysis so
that we can study the world that does exist. ”
Herriges and Shogren explore the implications
of Coasian bargaining with transaction costs. We
construct an experimental design where two parties
bargain over a fixed reward given both discrete and
continuous real-time transaction costs. The objec-
tive is to examine how transaction costs impact
efficiency, the distribution of wealth, and temporal
dimension of bargaining. Testing the robustness of
the Cease theorem under alternative assumptions is
essential to understand which complications re-
strict the efficacy of bargaining and negotiated en-
vironmental settlements. By identifying key insti-
tutional arrangements that increase effective and
efficient agreements, experiments are a helpful
tool for effective policy reform.
The experimental design employs a bilateral
bargaining framework. Alternating pairs of sub-
*Subject A’s outside option.
**Subject B‘s outside option.
@Effi~ientnumber—100% chance of victory for A anclB.
jects bargain over the chance of winning a mone-
tary reward as specified by a binary lottery.6 Six
unique transaction cost sessions were examined.
Each session involved bargaining over two con-
tracts—the number contract and the transfer con-
tract. The number contract specifies the initial
chances of winning the reward, requiring the pair
to select one number out of six from a “Lottery
Schedule”. For example, Table 1 shows that if
number 3 is selected, subject A owns 50 out of 100
lottery tickets implying a 50% chance of victory,
subject B has 30 tickets implying a 3090 chance,
while the house has a 20% chance to keep the
reward. The transfer contract specifies how the
subjects distribute the lottery tickets. Given num-
ber 3 is chosen, if subject B agrees to give subject
A 25 tickets, A’s chance of victory increases to
75%, while B’s chance falls to 5%.
Opportunity costs are determined by the alloca-
tion of property rights. Prior to each session for
each pairing, we designate the “controller’ ‘—the
subject given the unilateral property right over the
Lottery Schedule. The controller has the right to
unilaterally select a number—the outside option—
from the Schedule and inform the monitor, who
will then end the session, The outside option or
opportunity cost equals 8070 for each player in
Table 1. No agreement contract needs to be
signed. The other subject attempts to influence the
controller to reach a mutually acceptable agree-
ment by offering to give some of his or her lottery
tickets to the controller.
An agreement is eflcient if joint expected re-
turns are maximized, and rational if both subjects
receive at least their potential opportunity cost. Us-
ing the values from Table 1, Figure 1illustrates the
efficient bargaining frontier where subject A is the
controller. The six asterisks represent the six num-
4 These mechanisms include tradable emission permits or common
pool allocation schemes.
5 See Hoffman and Spitzer, for example.
6 A binary lottery controls for risk preferences since expected utility
can be normalized. The value of a large reward is set at unity, while the
value of a small reward is set at zero, thereby implying that expected
































Figure 1. Efficient Bargaining Frontier
ber contracts from Table 1. Allpoints below the
diagonal line areinefficient-a joint maximum is
not achieved. Given A’s 80$Z0 outside option, the
Nash equilibrium requires A and B to split the
remaining 20?70chance equally such that A has a
90% chance to win and B has 10% chance. Note
that a commonly observed focal point is the equal
split where both have a 5070 chance to win.’
7 A focnl point is any outcome that attracts bargainers (see Schelling).
In this case, the equal split acts as a focal point for players who follow
social cues to divide the chances equal] y. Thus, the players are argued to
act more like fairpersons than the rational gamespersons that theory
predicts. See Roth (1987) for a discussion of fairness and gamesperson-
ship in bargaining experiments. But note that fairness may result from
uncontrolled loyalty to the bargaining opponent. Shogren (1992) ob-
served that if loyalties are explicitly controlled, then fairness no longer
remains am issu~ba.rgainers nre extremely competitive.
For each bargaining session the reward is 10
chips worth fifty cents each. The 10 chip reward
was amassed by requiring a contribution of 5 chips
from the controller, 1 chip from the other subject,
and 4 chips from the house. Given the potential for
uncontrolled nonmonetary motivation as reflected
by the equal split focal point, we require a larger
contribution from the controller to provide more
incentive for rational bargaining.
Each bargain has a 5 minute time limit with the
maximum 10 chip reward decreasing over time to
reflect real-time transaction costs. Figure 2a illus-
trates the three discrete transaction costs ses-
sions—rewards decrease by 10 chips after 5 min-
utes, 5 chips every 2.5 minutes, and 2 chips every










Figure 2. Transaction Costs
sions—rewards decrease at a constant, increasing, agreement, the final reward is 8 chips. If the ses-
or a decreasing rate. For example, in the linear sion lasts 3.5 minutes, the reward is 3 chips. The
session the 10 chip reward decreases immediately clock stops either after both parties sign the agree-
such that if the pairing takes 1 minute to reach an ment form, or if the controller unilaterally ends theShogren Experimental Marke(s and Envirormeental Po)icy 121
session. Each subject participated in all six ses-
sions, each with a unique pairing. All bargains
used a personal computer that illustrate transaction
costs by a shrinking bar graph. All bargains were
face-to-face. No physical threats are allowed. In
addition to winnings from the bargaining sessions,
subjects received a $4 hour]y payment.
Three observations emerge from the bargaining
experiments. First, transaction costs significantly
reduce the efficiency of the bargaining sessions.
Specifically, nearly 75% of the potential gains
from bargaining are lost, Although a portion of this
loss is due to the transaction costs themselves, con-
siderable dead-weight loss persists. Second, the
bargaining agreements cluster around equitable
splits, rather than the outside option or Nash equi-
librium, supporting earlier studies. But the propen-
sity for equitable splits decreases as a bargainer’s
wealth diminishes, and is significantly affected by
the genders of the bargaining pair. 8 Third, a
“deadline effect” is not observed across all treat-
ments—bargainers do not wait until the last mo-
ment before agreeing on a contract. We attribute
this result to both the transaction costs and the
ability of the owner of the property rights to uni-
laterally end the bargain.
Environmental policy. reform through dispute
resolution and negotiated settlements must identify
the relationship between transaction costs, institu-
tional structures, and relevant indicators of success
(e.g., economic efficiency, distribution of wealth).
The lessons learned in the lab provide insight into
how transaction costs affect the potential efficacy
of environmental negotiation. Key issues that can
be considered in the lab include how bargaining is
affected by uncertain contract enforcement, multi-
party bargains, bargains with principal-agent rela-
tionships, managed and unmanaged negotiation,
the impact of a third-party negotiator, and alterna-
tive preferences.
3. Environmental Conflict
Environmental conflict comes in all shapes and
forms. People exposed to industrial waste dis-
charge or intensive agri-chemical use devote sub-
stantial resources to protect themselves from the
risk. Individuals construct filtering systems, firms
do likewise. The United States and Canada debate
over acid deposition, as do Sweden and Great Brit-
ain. North Carolina and Tennessee have conflict-
ing views over the potential for dioxin contamina-
tion of the Pigeon river. As pressure mounts to use
scarce natural resources wisely, the intensity of
environmental conflict will undoubtedly increase.
Environmental policy encourages conflict by
promoting technological solutions that simply
transfer risk through time or space. Obvious ex-
amples include taller stacks for air emissions and
storage facilities for nuclear waste. Taller stacks
transfer the risk to other geographic regions, while
storage sites transfer risk to future generations.
These conflicts evolve from unilateral, noncooper-
ative action of one individual, firm, state, or coun-
try transferring risk to others. The end result is too
many resources devoted to reduce environmental
risk—this is somewhat unexpected since econo-
mists have traditionally argued that too few re-
sources are employed in pollution control. Tech-
nology that transfers risk creates conflict, and a
well-intended policy prescription results in ineffi-
cient resource allocation.9
Game theory and gaming experiments are well-
-suitedto study the economic implications of envi-
ronmental conflict. A rich variety of strategic be-
havior can be explored to better understand how
noncooperative behavior in pollution control and
misallocate scarce resources. A measure of ineffi-
ciency in a conflict-rent dissipation—reflects the
consequence of a wide range of strategic behavior.
The trade-off between the social cost of pollution
and rent dissipation can be evaluated in the lab.
To illustrate, consider a conflict where two iden-
tical risk neutral players, 1 and 2, compete to win
a reward G. Let x, and x2represent the irreversible
effort expended by players 1 and 2 to win the con-
flict, The probability that player 1 or 2 wins is
represented by p, = pl(xl ,X2)and p2 = p2(x1,X2).
Assume P1 = ~Pi/~Xi > 0, p; = 82pi/dX~< 0,
dpildxj<0, and dp~ldxj<0 for j # i. The first two
terms reflect the standard assumption of diminish-
ing returns to effort, while the third and fourth
terms imply that player j’s effort decreases both
the total and marginal productivity of effort of
player i.
Player i selects xi to maximize his or her ex-
pected payoffs
Max [pi(xl,XZ)G – Ci(xi)],
yielding the following first- and second-order con-
ditions for an interior maximum
where Ci(xi) is the cost function for effort ex-
pended in the contest. Assume C[ >0 and C: <0.
8 Women were more Iikely to bargain to equal splits with men than













cl C2 C3 C4 C5
400,400 400,1660 400,1570 400,1520 400, 1120*
1660,400 700,1180 580, 121O** 536,1204 380,960
1570,400 747,1043 610,1090 557,1093 357,893
1520,400 758,982 616,1034 560, 104O* 342,858
1120,400 640,700 503,747 442,758 160,640
L
Figure3. 5 X 5Expected PayoffTabie
Given specific probability-of-winning functions
(e.g., logit), Baik and Shogren demonstrate that if
one player has more ability—the favorite—such
that his or her chances of victory exceed one-half
at the Nash equilibrium, both players will prefer
the weaker player—the underdog—to commit to
expend effort first. Both players’ expected payoffs
are the greatest if the underdog leads and the fa-
vorite follows given sub ame perfection is used as
?0 theequilibrium concept. This reduces social cost
by reducing rent dissipation, The Canadian-US
acid rain debate is an example of the underdog
moving first to enact environmental policy before
the favorite (Forster).
Holt et al. test the robustness of the favorite-
underdog hypothesis by constructing a two-stage
gaming experiment. In Stage 1the favorite and the
underdog independently decide to whether lead or
follow. In Stage 2 the players select a level of
effort in the order determined in Stage 1. Within
this design there are three potential subgames—
simultaneous-move subgame, 11favorite-leads sub-
game, and the underdog-leads subgame. Figure 3
illustrates a 5 X 5 expected payoff matrix, where
each cell lists payoffs in tokens worth $0.01 each.
For example, if the underdog selects row R2 and
the favorite selects column C3, the underdog’s ex-
pected payoff is 580 tokens—$5 .80, while the fa-
vorite expects to earn 1210 tokens—$ 12.10.
Twenty trials are run, each player faces a different
opponent for each trial, and there is no time limit.
One trial is selected at random to determine take-
home pay. 12
There are three potential equilibria in Table 1.
First, the equilibrium in the simultaneous-move
subgame is (R4, C4) = (560, 1040)—neither
player has an unilateral incentive to deviate from
his or her strategy, given the supposed strategy of
the other player. Second, the equilibrium in the
favorite-leads subgame is (R 1, C5) = (400,
1120). Third, the equilibrium in the underdog-
10ln ~~u]ti.~tage game, a subgame perfect equilibrium exis~ if eveV
subgame has a Nash equilibrium—no player has an incentive to deviate
from his or her choice of effort at any stage of the game. The criteria for
a Nash equilibrium is that each player maximizes his or ber own ex-
pected payoffs, given the likely actions of the other player. See Fuden-
berg and Tirole (pp. 6!L1OO) for a detailed discussion of subgame per-
fection,
ILNote that if both players decide to lead or if bOth decide tOfO1lOw,
then effori will be selected simultaneously in Stage 2.
12The “se of a random-trial-payoff scheme Wiil not affect behavior if
the independence axiom supporting expected utility theory holds, i.e., if
expected utility is linear in probabilities.
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leads subgame is (R2, C3) = (580, 1210), Since
both players’ expected payoffs in the underdog-
leads subgame exceed those in the other two sub-
games (favorite-1210 > 1120 > 1040; under-
dog—580 > 560 > 400), the subgame perfect
equilibrium is for the underdog to move first and
selectR2 and for the favorite to follow and selectC3,
Overall, the results do not support the theory.
Instead, the results suggest that the underdogs do
not always prefer to lead (35-58% in all trials) and
favorites do not always follow (55–77%). Under-
dogs who lead overinvest in effort, while favorites
underinvest. Total dissipation of the reward is also
greater than predicted—a result more consistent
with the argument that number 2 tries harder. This
breakdown of subgame perfection is supported by
the seemingly irrational behavior observed in
McKelvey and Palfrey’s centipede gaming exper-
iment, The failure to support subgame perfection,
even in our relatively straigtforward game, sug-
gests that we should remain cautious in predicting
environmental policy reform based on gaming be-
havior until we better understand the limits of stra-
tegic behavior and dynamic choice in games with
complete information. 13
Another important, but relatively unexplored,
area of environmental conflict is the private en-
forcement of environment regulation. The regula-
tor sets incentives through symmetric, asymmet-
ric, or no reimbursement than can influence the
level of investment in legal resources, thereby
changing the social cost of the conflict. A regula-
tor’s choice of legal fee reimbursement and its ef-
ficiency effects can be explored in the lab. In ad-
dition, a private enforcer has a choice of whom to
sue-either the polluting firm or the federal or
state agency responsible for the enforcement of the
regulation. The choice reveals the private enforc-
er’s preferences both for outcomes and for the lot-
teries that define the probabilities of achieving
these outcomes. Depending on relative costs and
benefits, the enforcer will sue the agent most likely
to produce the desired objective. Finally, lab work
can explore the link between Coasian bargaining
and conflict rules where zero rent dissipation can
be maintained as a Nash equilibrium, thereby al-
lowing settlement of the suit prior to trial.
4. Risk Reduction Mechanisms
Psychologists have observed that an individual’s
valuation of a good can be influenced by altern-
ativeways of representing the good (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman). In the case of environmental risk,
n ~~o SWRoth (1991), stiti (1992), and Stone and Schaffner (ch, 9)
this evidence suggests that how the risk is reduced
may affect the value an individual assigns to the
protection of life and limb. Since individuals can
reduce the expected damages of an environmental
risk by employing self-protection or self-insur-
ance, either privately or collectively, understand-
ing how the risk reduction mechanism affects
value is important for public policy (Shogren and
Crocker 1991). Self-protection reduces the proba-
bility of the loss, while self-insurance reduces its
severity (Ehrlich and Becker),
In a classic two-state world, if self-protection
guarantees a O%probability of a loss and a 100%
probability of a gain, an individual’s value for self-
protection is his or her certainty equivalent, x,
such that
U(M+G–x)=pU(M– L)
+ (1-p)U(M + G) (1)
where p and 1-p (Os p s 1) are mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive probabilities of a mon-
etary loss, $L, and a monetary gain, $G. Let U
represent the thrice differentiable, continuous, in-
creasing von Neumann-Morganstem expected util-
ity function, and M be endowed monetary wealth.
In contrast, self-insurance reduces the loss, L, to
zero, while maintaining the original odds for a gain
pU(M – Z) + (1-p)U(M + G – Z) =
pU(M – L) + (1-p)U(M + G) (2)
where z is the individual’s value of self-insurance
risk reduction.
Although a person can access combinations of
these risk reduction mechanisms, little is known
about how these substitution opportunities affect
rational choice under risk. To better understand
rationality given multiple opportunities to reduce a
risk, Shogren and Crocker (1993) designed a set of
experimental risk reduction auctions of sequential
substitution between private and collective self-
protection or self-insurance. The increased oppor-
tunity set can reveal implicit preferences for alter-
native risk reduction mechanisms.
We test rational behavior by examining two hy-
potheses—whether the sequencing of the private
and collective mechanisms affects valuation, and
whether individuals prefer self-protection to self-
insurance. First, Shogren (1990) observed that in
the single mechanism markets, private risk reduc-
tion was preferred to collective reduction. The dis-
parity in private and collective values probably re-
flected the perceived impact of the two auction
mechanisms. Individuals may perceive the private
auction as more effective than the collective auc-
tion where they had less control and the incentive
to report low bids. This incentive should remain in
the multiple mechanism markets regardless of the
sequence of the private or collective auction. If the124 Oc~ober 1993
sequence matters it is critical that future attempts
to value risk using contingent valuation should in-
corporate various feasible combinations of the al-
ternative risk reduction mechanisms.
Second, theory and evidence both suggest that
self-protection should be preferred to self-
insurance, Examining equations (1) and (2), the
value of self-protection exceeds the value for self-
insurance for the risk neutral or risk averse ex-
pected utility maximizing individual, x > z. For a
risk neutral individual, x = p(L + G) and z =
pL, implying x > z. For a risk averse individual,
x= M+ G–U–l(EU)andz =M+G–
U-l(EU + p[U(M + G – Z) – U(M – L)]),
again implying x > z. The single market experi-
ments supported this result. Multiple opportunities
should not change this incentive—self-protection
should be preferred to self-insurance. We test this
hypothesis by comparing the final experienced
bids for self-protection and self-insurance for both
private and collective auctions. Further evidence
of a difference supports the argument that both
probability and severity reduction must be consid-
ered in risk valuation.
The experiment constructs private and collective
risk reduction mechanisms by combining two auc-
tions for self-protection and self-insurance. The
private auction is a Vickrey sealed bid, second
price auction where the highest bidder secures the
100% risk reduction and pays the highest losing
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Smith (1980) sealed bid auction, where the cost to
reduce risk equaled the sum of the subjects’ ex-
pected consumer surplus. Costs were not public
information. If the sum of collective bids exceed
the costs of provision, the mean collective bid was
posted as the reigning price. Unanimity was re-
quired such that any one could veto collective risk
reduction. Collective reduction was also rejected if
the summed bids were less than costs.
The auction environment is defined as follows,
Let Mi(t) = (m~(t), m~(t))represent the set,ofmes-
sages sent by subject i in trial t, where mj(t) and
m;(t) are the messages sent in auction 1 and 2 by
subject i. The set of all messages sent in auctions
1and 2 at trial t are represented by ml(t) = (m!(t),
m2(t), . . . ,
-1
m?(t)) and m2(t) = (m:(t),
m2(t), . . . , m;(t)), The commodity to be auc-
tioned, hi(t) or h2(t), is a private or collective risk
reduction from a binary lottery, & = [p, + $G;
(l-p), – $L]. The parameters for the four binary
lottery treatments were p = 1%, 10%, 2070, 40%,
L = $4, G = $1, and M = $10. Let hi(t) =
(h;(t), h?(t), . . . , h:(t)) and h2(t) = (hi(t),
h!(t), . . . , h;(t)) reflect the allocation rules in the
auctions. The cost rules for the auction are written
as Cl(t) = (C:(t), C;(t), . . . , C;(t)) and C2(t) =
(c;(t), c:(t), . . . . C;(t)), were Cj(t) and C;(t)
are the costs to the agent i in auctions 1 and 2.
Given these definitions, the institutional struc-




h~(ml(t)) = 1, C/(ml(t)) = b?(t); h~(ml(t)) = O, C~(ml(t)) = O
r
n




h~(m2(t)) = 1, C~(m2(t)) = ~ b~(t)/nVi ~ b:(t) ~ EICSI and V = O
ial inl 1
bid. The Vickrey auction has been promoted as a
possible elicitation device for contingent valuation
because of its well-known preference revealing
properties. 14The collective auction was a modified
14The intuitionbehindthe Vickrey auctiOn is straightforward. lf a
player bids higher than ber true value, she increases the probability of
winning the prize, but she also increases tbe likelihood that the highest
losing bid will exceed ber true value, thereby resulting in a negative
sucplus. Alternatively, bidding lower than her true value decreases the
likelihood of winning the prize, The dominant strategy is for the player
to bid her true value,
where all messages are in the form of bids—mj (t)
= b;(t) and m:(t) = b~(t). Let bids be ordered from
highest to lowest such that b~(t) > by(t) >. . .>
b?(t) and b+(t) > b:(t) > . . . > b;(t). Also V =
O reflects unanimity in collective voting for risk
reduction, and V a 1implies at least one veto vote
in the collective. Expected consumer surplus,
E[CS], is the cost to supply the collective risk re-
duction.
Four markets were created—(a) Private, then
Collective self-protection; (b) Collective, then Pri-Shogren Experimental Markets and Environmental Policy 125
vate self-protection; (c) Private, then Collective
self-protection; and (d) Collective, then Private
self-insurance. The Private, then Collective Mar-
kets first gave the subjects an opportunity to reduce
risk via the Vickrey auction. After the highest bid-
der was announced, the subjects had the opportu-
nity to collectively reduce risk. All subjects, in-
cluding the highest bidder in the private auction,
reported a bid for collective provision. If the col-
lective provision was rejected, only the highest
bidder in the private auction secured a 100% risk
reduction. The Collective, then Private Markets
operated identically with one noted exception—if
collective provision was accepted, the private mar-
ket did not operate. Otherwise, the private auction
was held.
The subject’s rational behavior is defined as
Mi(t) = ~(ui, n > 1 I I), where Uiis the value of
risk reduction for subject i, Our results suggest the
risk reduction mechanism still matters, but not as
much. We reject the hypothesis that the order of
the multiple markets does not influence the value
of risk reduction. Table 2 displays the statistics for
a Wilcoxon rank sum test to compare the private
and collective bids in each market. For each lottery
in each market, statistically significant differences
between private and collective bids always oc-
curred in the Private, then Collective markets (5%
confidence level). But in the Collective, then Pri-
vate markets, the frequency of significant differ-
ences between private and collective bids was only
Table 2. Order of Multiple Markets and the
Value of Risk Reduction: Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Tests between Average Private and Collective
Bids for Combined Markets
Observed
Loss Test Significance
Market Probability Statistic Level
Self-protection, then 1% –2,403 ,y2*
collective protection 10% –3.347 ,0()*
20% –3.347 .00*
40% –3.643 ,()()*
Collective protection, 1% –1,935 ,05*
then self-protection 10% – 1.678 .09
20% – 1.676 .09
40% –0.714 .48
Self-insurance, then 1% – 3.095 ,00*
collective insurance 1o% –2.664 .O1*
20% – 2.664 ,0]*
40% –2,896 ,00.
Collective insurance, 1% –1.416 .16
then self-insurance 1070 – 1.038 .30
20% – 1,038 ,30
40% –0.669 .50
*Significant at 95~olevel or better that bids were not derived
from the same paretal distribution.
12.5%. In one case the collective bid actually ex-
ceed the private bid (109olottery-Collective, then
Private self-protection). This result points out the
importance of understanding the relationship be-
tween collective and private actions.
We also reject the hypothesis that self-protection
is valued more highly than self-insurance. Table 3
presents the Wilcoxon matched sample sign test
where in only 2 of 16 cases did the self-protection
and self-insurance bids exhibit statistically signif-
icant differences, This result challenges Shogren’s
(1990) earlier support of the hypothesis, and vio-
lates the first-order stochastic dominance property
of expected utility theory. This is somewhat dis-
couraging in that the additional complexity of se-
quential risk reduction opportunities is a mere frac-
tion of the complexity in the world. Future at-
tempts to value reductions in risk need to consider
how alternative risk reduction mechanism affects
the revealed value of life and limb.
5. Food Safety
Policy makers need information on the benefits
and costs of food safety to enact effective national
policy, Current estimates of the costs of food-
bome illness range from $4.8 billion to $23 bil-
lion. But it is posited that these cost-of-illness
measures underestimate the true cost of unsafe
food because individuals presumably would be
willing to pay more than the actual costs in-
curred-Roberts argues that the true cost is under-
estimated by at least an order of magnitude. This
implies that we need to develop valuation tech-
niques to estimate the demand for safer food. Sur-
vey methods such as the contingent valuation
method allow one to directly obtain value esti-
mates. But regardless of how well these surveys
are designed and executed, people still know they
are valuing a hypothetical scenario. The absence of
real market discipline creates an environment con-
ducive to inaccurate and unreliable responses.
The lab offers an alternative approach to elicit
values for safer food. Following the pioneering
work of Bohm (1972) and Coursey et al., Hayes et
al. construct an experimental auction market to
elicit the value of safer food. The experimental
markets elicit the option price measures of value
for five food-borne pathogens---campylobacte rs,
Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella
spiralis, and Clostridium perfringens. In addition,
we constructed six additional experiments to eval-
uate how subjects respond to changes in the risk of
illness for a given pathogen—Salmonella, and to
determine if there is a pattern of surrogate bidding
in the elicited values. All experiments use real126 October 1993 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Self-protection versus Self-Insurance: Wilcoxon Matched Sample Sign Tests for
Valuation Difference between Protection and Insurance
Private Bid Collective Bid
Observed Observed
Loss Test Significance Test Significance

















































*Significant at 95% level that bids were not derived from the same parental distribution.
money, real food, repeated opportunities to partic-
ipate in the auction market, and full information on
the probability and severity of the food borne
pathogen.
Performed at the Iowa State University meat-
testing lab with modem kitchen facilities, the gen-
eral experimental design follows a two stage pro-
cedure—first, after subjects fill out a questionnaire
on general knowledge of food safety and personal
food consumption patterns, a five trial pre-test us-
ing a candy bar is used to acquaint the subjects
with the Vickrey auction. Second, two types of
food items are introduced and described to the sub-
jects. One item is a test product purchased from a
local source with the typical odds of being con-
taminated with a food borne pathogen. The second
item was the same product stringently screened for
pathogens with a low probability (1in 100 million)
of illness. Ten trials of the Vickrey auction are
used to elicit “naive” bids to upgrade to the strin-
gently controlled item from the test item. The bids
are naive in that the monitor does not provide in-
formation on the objective odds of illness; only the
individual’s subjective perception and the second
highest bid are available to guide bidding. After
trial ten, the monitor provides information about
the objective chance and severity of the pathogen.
Ten more trials are run to elicit “informed” bids.
The objective chance was calculated for the like-
lihood that a typical U.S. consumer would become
ill from the relevant pathogen for one meat-related
meal.
Our results suggest four patterns of behavior.
First, we examined whether our data fit the oft-
observed empirical phenomena that people tend to
overestimate low probability risks. If so, this
would violate the linearity-in-probabilities condi-
tion in the independence axiom underlying ex-
pected utility theory (Machina). We elicited each
subject’s subjective probability of food borne risk
by asking him or her to estimate the number of
people out of 1 million who will become ill from
the pathogen given that one consumes an average
American diet. The results that the subjects actu-
ally underestimate the annual probability of be-
coming ill from a food-borne pathogen, a result
inconsistent with earlier observations (see Viscusi
and Magat).
Second, we measured the ex ante economic
value to reduce the risk from each of the five
pathogens. Figure 4 shows the average bids per
trial with and without outliers for Campylobacter.
For each participant, we elicited either the option
price to decrease the objective risk of a given
pathogen to a 1in 100 million chance, or the com-
pensation demanded for an increase in risk from
the 1 in 100 million odds to the objective risk
level. The robustness of the observed measures of
value is explored given repeated market participa-
tion with and without full information of the ob-
jective probability and severity of the given patho-
gen. We expect the value measures to reflect the
wide range of objective risks (1 in 125,000 to 1 in
25 million). Our results suggest that the value mea-
sure is not particularly robust to changes in the
relative risk levels of the five pathogens. Value is
fairly constant across pathogens, even given the
wide range of risks.
Third, given this pattern of constant bidding, we
next elicited the value for one pathogen, Salmo-
nella, given ten-fold increases in the level of risk
ranging between a 1 in 13.7 chance to 1 in
1,370,000 chance. This allows us to examine how
people respond to increases in the probability of
illness, holding the severity of the illness constant.
The results of these treatments suggest that the
marginal option price decreases as risk increases,
an observation consistent with the hypothesis thatShogren Experimental Markets and Environmental Policy 127
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Figure 4. Average Option Price and Compensation Demanded for Campylobacter
people will pay more to eliminate the last bit of a
risk than they will pay for an equal decrease that
still leaves them facing a substantial risk (see Tver-
sky and Kahneman).
Fourth, we tested for the existence of surrogate
bidding. Kahneman argued that surrogate bidding
exists if the value measures for a specific patho-
gens act as ersatz measures for general food safety
preferences, If surrogate bidding prevails, then
values for specific goods can not be relied on as
accurate indicators of preference. Our work pro-
vides the first test of surrogate bidding in a lab
valuation experiment with real money, a real good,
and repeated market participation. We test for sur-
rogate bidding by comparing tbe value estimates
from each pathogen treatment with the value esti-
mate from a treatment that combines all the patho-
gens. The objective risk of the combined patho-
gens is a 1 in 46,000 chance of illness per meal
from at least one of the pathogens. Our results
reveal evidence of surrogate bidding in that the
average option price of the five pathogen treat-
ments is not significantly different from the aver-
age value for a reduction in the combined risk of
all five pathogens. Overall, subjects paid about
$0.70 per meal to upgrade to a safer food product;
an amount robust to the experimental treatment.
Experiments with repeated market experience
provide a well defined incentive structure that al-
lows a person to learn that honest revelation of his
or her true preferences is his or her best strategy.
The relative ability to isolate and control potential
problems such as surrogate bidding reveals exper-
imental markets as a viable alternative to standard
nonmarket valuation methods to evaluate the de-
mand for safer food. Other applications of our ex-
perimental markets reveal patterns of regional vari-
ation in willingness to pay for increased food
safety. Subjects in Arkansas and Massachusetts
paid approximately twice as much as subjects in
Iowa and California for the same reduction in ex-
posure to Salmonella. We have also used the mar-
kets to explore consumer reaction to new food
products and processes. Results suggest that in-
formed consumers will accept milk from cows and
lean pork from animals treated with growth hor-
mones. Preliminary results also suggest a high
level of acceptance of pork products treated by
irradiation for the control of Trichinella, even
among uninformed consumers.128 October 1993 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
6. Concluding Remarks
Information on how institutional incentives affect
efficiency and how individuals value nonmat-ket
goods is needed to guide environmental policy.
Complementing field data, lab experiments pro-
vide insight to guide the decision maker’s best
guess as to the likely outcome of a proposed pol-
icy. Remaining skeptics may complain that envi-
ronmental issues are too complex to be adequately
captured in the lab. Two retorts-first, a general
theory should work in a specific case. If not, it
casts doubt on its general validity, allowing one to
question the applicability of the theory to the more
complicated world. The lab often provides the
cleanest possible test of a specific case. Second, as
argued by Plott (1989), complexity is not an argu-
ment against experiments, but rather an argument
for a certain type of research programane where
the complexity of the lab experiment gradually in-
creases to allow one to isolate and control the fac-
tors found to decrease the robustness of the model.
The best guesses guiding environmental policy can
be improved with careful identification of how
such complexities as transaction costs, conflicts
and strategy, alternative ways to reduce risk, and
information affect behavior and value.
One last indulgence. Experiments have been
promoted as an ex ante means to strengthen the
contingent valuation (CVM) of nonmarket goods
(see Coursey and Schulze). The idea is to go into
the lab prior to the CVM survey to pretest incen-
tive design. The ex ante research should improve
the accuracy of the CVM survey by observing how
bidding behavior is affected by alternative incen-
tive compatible auctions and repeated market ex-
perience. I agree—but I also believe experiments
can be used ex post as well. For lack of a better
name, call this proposed ex post procedure CVM-
X. There are four steps to CVM-X. First, after
testing and revising the questionnaire, run the
CVM survey and elicit hypothetical or real bids for
the good in question. Second, bring subsamples of
the CVM respondents into the lab to determine
how their initial CVM bids are affected by a lab
environment with real goods, real money, repeated
market experience and alternative demand reveal-
ing auctions, Third, apply appropriate statistical
analysis to predict the final experienced bids (X)
based on the initial hypothetical bids and other
socio-economic characteristics. Finally, adjust the
bids of the CVM respondents who did not partic-
ipate in the lab experiments for the learning and
market experience effects revealed by the subsam-
ple. The CVM-X procedure could prove a cost-
effective tool to combine the strengths of CVM
and the lab-increasing the accuracy of a survey,
and broadening the scope of nonmarket valuation
in the lab. We are currently designing a CVM-X
test on consumer acceptance of food irradiation;
other applications would be enlightening.
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